Belated - SAF Afghanistan exhibition at Takashimaya

The Guards' new Light Strike Vehicle. 

(unfortunately, no pictures of the LSV with weapons fitted have surfaced so far.)

Pegasus Singapore Light Weight Howitzer - implicated in India!

Once more - the Bv 206 Weapon Locating Radar. (The author regrets not checking if it was the same vehicle as the one displayed at Toa Payoh HDB Hub, MID 56331)

A Singapore-made Skyblade UAV, and the familiar Army Intelligence banner, reminding one of the recent restructuring of Army Intelligence.

Aster 30s to replace I-Hawks

SAF to buy Aster-30 surface-to-air missile system

Aster 30 

I-Hawk, standing down after 30 years

The announcement that the RSAF would be replacing the American I-HAWK system with the European Aster 30 surprised me, but more on the surprise later.

One would imagine the Singaporean defence establishment thus has some familiarity with the Aster 30 system: The Singaporean Navy currently uses Aster 30 and Aster 15 missiles on its Formidable-class frigates. Aster 30s are designed to take care of air-breathing threats such as aircraft and helicopters while Aster 15 missiles handle incoming antiship missiles.  There were murmurings about integrating the Navy's Aster's into Singapore's air defence umbrella, perhaps with ships launching from portside or not too far offshore. Evidently this came true in another fashion.

The I-Hawk's range is about 40 km, and the Aster is 120 km. Altitude numbers are not everything, but the RSAF's Air Defence Group once again has a long arm not seen since the days of SADA's Bloodhound SAM and its 85 km range.

(picture source)

All the best to the personnel of 163 Squadron - exciting times.

As mentioned, this did surprise me a bit - your author had been indulging in pipe dreams that the RSAF would acquire Israeli Arrows, David's Sling or the Iron Dome, especially since we had acquired the Spyder for low-level air defence.

On hindsight, I should have ruled out the Arrow and the Sling - these are theater ballistic missiles, really overkill in our context. I was looking too closely at Singapore-Israeli cooperation and the economies of scale for both nations.

David's Sling

Arrow

Now, your author mentioned the Iron Dome earlier, which was designed for C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery and mortar) fire and could be pressed into service against low-flying craft in a pinch. With the I-Hawks being gracefully retired; there is another RSAF squadron in the Air Defence Group that has been soldiering on with very "senior" albeit heavily upgraded weapons. This squadron specializes in short-range point air defence.

Perhaps something to keep an eye on?

Russian naval deployment to Syria

The Russian Slava-class cruiser. The Moskva, the lead ship of the class, has been deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean 

There are a few possible reasons for the continued Russian naval deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean off Syria. There are even reports that their carrier (or heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser) will rock up.

1)Evacuation. Considering that two landing ships are being sent, this certainly passes the plausibility check. The decision to evacuate Tartus now is interesting - perhaps meant to prevent any retaliation to Russian nationals from parties in Syria, or to remove the base from the great power equation being played out right now.

2) SIGINT gathering – this is a once-in-a-lifetime chance to gather intelligence on US/NATO communications, the signatures of stealth bombers and perhaps other classified platforms loitering or on the attack, and the chance to see how the US does its work firsthand. Moreover, they could give a friendly tipoff to Assad and the world if something happened - something highlighted by the casual breaking of news about ballistic launches in the Mediterranean a while earlier. (The earlier RT source even said as much: According to a ministry spokesman’s Tuesday statement, the key task of the Russian standing naval force in the Mediterranean is “comprehensive monitoring over the air, underwater, and surface situation in the zone of its deployment.”)

3) Showing the flag to Russian allies and partners. I am not entirely sure whom - the Central Asian republics? Vietnam, a major arms purchaser? In any case, this does prove Russia's power projection capability. Nonetheless, this does also showcase its limits: it's unclear if the presence of the Black Sea Fleet's ships genuinely deters US intervention. The risk of SIGINT leaks or a play-by-play retelling of NATO maneuvers in the eastern Med is one thing, but short of another sneaky Pristina airport incident (James Blunt saved the world, check it out), your author is honestly unconvinced barring access to more classified information and the inner thoughts and communications of the leaders involved in the crisis. There might yet be an unknown factor.

Do small countries have an easier task of maintaining secrecy?

In the light of the Bradley Manning trial and the snickering directed at the United States, your author was drawn to consider the task of maintaining secrecy. This mainly refers to defence arrangements and intelligence - commercial and private organizations' secrets are another kettle of fish.

Put simply: while smaller, "second-tier" nations may have an easier task of maintaining secrecy. Countries like Singapore, South Korea and South Africa have less resources to commit to keeping their secrets confidential, their limited interests and global footprint may possibly serve to keep them off the radar. 

This may allow them to have an easier task of maintaining secrecy, compared to nations such as the US or Russia that are on everyone's radar.

On the other hand, delving deeper into this; the security arrangements of these small states may in fact be an open book to others, something that a penetrating organization would not wish to call attention to. The central problem is the nature of the topic - secret things are secret, as some might say.

Due to lack of information (and your author's lack of statistics training), any more speculation on this weak point can only be conjecture.

At best, the limited interests of these nations reduce the incentive for any would-be spies to make a splash globally, and reduce the numbers of those who would seek to uncover national secrets like hidden weapons programs, illegal spying or government leaders' foibles. A secret Chinese facility in the desert might raise eyebrows, but the same going up in Singapore may not hold the same value internationally.