http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/talk-of-saf-helping-out-in-rail-incidents-sparks-debate
Funnily enough, in the past two days ST's defence correspondent Mr Jermyn Chow has pushed out one print and four online (one being a reproduction of his print piece) articles on the issue. The comments on some of them pretty much sum up the public mood online.
One more thing I would like to add is that this introduces a 'moral hazard' to transport failures. The fact is that while SMRT's train services have been getting better, many Singaporeans have lost much faith in the company and its leadership. The reasons for this loss of faith may not be good, but while work is being done - and is underway - to address them, they will remain in the short term.
While this is very possibly just the drawer plan to end all drawer plans, its abbreviated reporting did it no favour here - perhaps the correspondent caught a phrase that hadn't been cleared for release and typesetted out in the finest PR prose?
Ultimately, it came across as public resources being used as a crutch for a weak organization.
In closing, it is right that the military stand prepared for civil emergencies; after all, Armour and other units helped out at the Hotel New World incident, and much has been said about the 1983 cable car tragedy.
That said, I'm not too clear on the legalities of the SAF assisting in civil situations - does it have to be formally requested, and who from? I don't believe the Statutes cover it, but I would like to be corrected.
The questions of: is this a serious enough emergency? and Is it warranted to deploy precious military force (for after all, the bulk of the manpower will come from conscripts with limited time in-service, possibly the limited pool of combat fit ones)? have been asked.
Knowing who would have to give the go-ahead will certainly throw light upon how things are run.
Tuesday 25 August 2015
Sunday 16 August 2015
Defence suppliers' cycle of dependence
Despite making some killer aircraft in the First World War, Sopwith found the ground cut out from under it in the postwar period. Despite a series of grand plans to adapt to the peacetime market it eventually folded.
Thanks to its niche clientele, defence companies are intensely familiar with a feast/famine situation. When competing for local military business or for an ever more competitive and sometimes even shrinking international markets, clinching a contract can mean a massive gold-plated income stream, and failing to gain one can be disastrous - the losers of the US' next generation bomber project may be forced to scale down their defence-related workforce and thus temporarily bow out of the military aviation market! Firms that are not sufficiently diversified are certainly uniquely vulnerable: no sane company can afford to keep its workforce twiddling its thumbs while it waits for the next big contract - even spare parts and support won't be enough to keep the designers and researchers occupied, unless it is diversified enough to draw upon revenues from other sectors. (Maybe if labour is liquid enough, they can be hired temporarily under contract.)
Unpredictable demand may well worsen the situation: a military supplier and a state would be a fool to enter into a sale without well-written contracts to specify who gets stuck holding the bag in case of cuts or unforseen situations, a la the Russian Mistrals.
Therefore, today, one big argument that governments put forward for "buying local" is the need to keep the local defence industry alive. This is sometimes against the will of militaries and the treasury.
This naturally raises a whole host of concerns; I wasn't aware that the defence budget was to serve as an industrial subsidy, although some western governments doubtless think it is. Subsidies of course come with issues of inefficiency. Big items such as the Japanese F-2 project are glaring examples, but lack of competition threatens to turn certain big concerns into protected sinecures. I'm sure the real everyday toll of industrial protection comes from sluggish support, poor management and the like that affects the service standards and products of defence firms.
As much as I would like to say, "let the free market sort it out - why should defence companies be privileged over any other?" this is a policy beyond the capability (or desire!) of many governments. This is doubly so in the Southeast Asian region.
Ideally, this feast/famine cycle could be 'resolved' not just by clear telegraphing of demand (or forcing a stable 'schedule' of work down buyers' and sellers' throats), but perhaps accepting that most military requirements aren't so special after all, and going 'civilian' whereever one can. If this leads to the military being more open and dependent on the wider market and society, so much the better! No wars were fought purely by the green machine, it always rests upon labour at home.
If subsidies are genuinely a must, focusing on certain key capabilities may be more affordable - small arms and ammunition manufacture, for instance, is well within the reach of most nations.
The alternative - to treat defence companies like immature seedlings that constantly need protection - is unpalatable to everyone. Except those with vested interests in these same firms.
Thanks to its niche clientele, defence companies are intensely familiar with a feast/famine situation. When competing for local military business or for an ever more competitive and sometimes even shrinking international markets, clinching a contract can mean a massive gold-plated income stream, and failing to gain one can be disastrous - the losers of the US' next generation bomber project may be forced to scale down their defence-related workforce and thus temporarily bow out of the military aviation market! Firms that are not sufficiently diversified are certainly uniquely vulnerable: no sane company can afford to keep its workforce twiddling its thumbs while it waits for the next big contract - even spare parts and support won't be enough to keep the designers and researchers occupied, unless it is diversified enough to draw upon revenues from other sectors. (Maybe if labour is liquid enough, they can be hired temporarily under contract.)
Unpredictable demand may well worsen the situation: a military supplier and a state would be a fool to enter into a sale without well-written contracts to specify who gets stuck holding the bag in case of cuts or unforseen situations, a la the Russian Mistrals.
Therefore, today, one big argument that governments put forward for "buying local" is the need to keep the local defence industry alive. This is sometimes against the will of militaries and the treasury.
This naturally raises a whole host of concerns; I wasn't aware that the defence budget was to serve as an industrial subsidy, although some western governments doubtless think it is. Subsidies of course come with issues of inefficiency. Big items such as the Japanese F-2 project are glaring examples, but lack of competition threatens to turn certain big concerns into protected sinecures. I'm sure the real everyday toll of industrial protection comes from sluggish support, poor management and the like that affects the service standards and products of defence firms.
As much as I would like to say, "let the free market sort it out - why should defence companies be privileged over any other?" this is a policy beyond the capability (or desire!) of many governments. This is doubly so in the Southeast Asian region.
Ideally, this feast/famine cycle could be 'resolved' not just by clear telegraphing of demand (or forcing a stable 'schedule' of work down buyers' and sellers' throats), but perhaps accepting that most military requirements aren't so special after all, and going 'civilian' whereever one can. If this leads to the military being more open and dependent on the wider market and society, so much the better! No wars were fought purely by the green machine, it always rests upon labour at home.
If subsidies are genuinely a must, focusing on certain key capabilities may be more affordable - small arms and ammunition manufacture, for instance, is well within the reach of most nations.
The alternative - to treat defence companies like immature seedlings that constantly need protection - is unpalatable to everyone. Except those with vested interests in these same firms.
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