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There are a couple of assumptions regarding post-independence Singapore's military history that die hard. I wrote my thesis on Singaporean defence in the post-independence period just last term, and to be honest it was really in reaction to some of these.
It was hardly inevitable to go from a practically disarmed island nation to the 'poison shrimp' concept, and later on to today's amply equipped SAF and its potential for preemptive strikes.
Firstly, the notion that Singapore was "abandoned" in defence after 1965 is seductive but false. The United Kingdom certainly caught the Singaporean leadership by surprise when it moved up its withdrawal schedule due to domestic concerns, with the PAP government ramping up negotiations behind the scenes as soon as it heard word and PM Lee Kuan Yew flying to London for talks as soon as the news broke publicly.
Nevertheless, the UK and the ANZAC states still had a vested interest in the stability of Malaysia and Singapore. There were a veritable raft of reasons. The UK still had commercial interests in Malaysia, with mining and plantation even more important in economically depressed times. The specter of Konfrontasi was fading, but having handed power over to friendly local elites, Whitehall and civil servants in London and on the ground in Southeast Asia would certainly do all they could to ensure their safety against Communist or other subversion. There was also the possibility of using military facilities in Singapore (or Malaysia) for force projection. As for the ANZAC nations, the concept of 'forward defence' of fighting the Communist menace in Southeast Asia before it reached Australian or New Zealand shores was in vogue.
Thus, the Five Power Defence Arrangements were negotiated to provide a framework for a joint Malaysian-Singaporean defence. Its chief instrument was a joint Malaysian-Singaporean integrated air defence system, aided by an Australian squadron of fighters, and for some years British and ANZAC troops deployed to the region and conducted exercises. Singapore's fledging military also benefited substantially from UK and Commonwealth collaboration for many years to come. In addition, British and other Commonwealth arms companies were eager to do business with Singapore. The island could have continued its defence collaboration with the UK/Commonwealth. Further collaboration was eventually abandoned in favour with other more cooperative partners, but to say that Singapore built up its defences in reaction to a 'British abandonment' is only a very small part of the story.
Secondly, would the territorial integrity of the island nation really be in question? We are constrained by a lack of information. The possibility of some sort of coup de main still remained, but the idee fixe common today of some sort of aggressive 'running amok' southwards would seem unlikely.
Having excised the 'cancer' of Communist Chinese subversion from the Federation by unanimously expelling Singapore, the expectation was that an independent Singapore would prove unviable and perhaps seek re-entry to Malaysia on Kuala Lumpur's terms. Some sort of forceful takeover would also be complicated by the presence of British and ANZAC troops. Besides, in the immediate term Malaysian troops were all over Singapore and Singapore's two infantry battalions had to divested of Malaysian personnel upon independence. With the mainland controlling Singapore's access to water and trade, was there really a need to even consider force?
Another thing I'd like to point out: even in separation, the governments of both Malaysia and Singapore still retained some enthusiasm for joint defence efforts, even if only in the name of defraying costs. The government in KL was not keen on devoting large amounts of GDP to defence, and a proposal was floated for Singapore to focus on providing naval defence for both nations, for example. The Lee cabinet's seeming profligacy in defence spending was greeted with some alarm by British Foreign Office negotiators!
