Friday 19 December 2014

Camp justice - we need more than legal statements


This case could potentially have been a very explosive one. Like it or not, the G-Wagen incident
involved spurious orders and unit culture and could have become a catchall for something many Singaporean conscripts would have experienced. The fact that a five-day safety timeout was ordered back then in 2012 might also mean that an astute staff team realized that deep issues had made themselves felt despite the SAF's avowed strong safety culture. 
MB-290 type jeep much like that involved
Nonetheless, the judge in this case has focused on the somewhat obvious principle that NSFs (conscripts) need not obey manifestly illegal orders. He even called on the officer representing Calvin Tan, the soldier driving the jeep, to "get the message out that national servicemen need not obey any such order."

(Admirably, the conducting officer has been charged as well.)

A "weak safety culture", as uncovered by the committee of inquiry, is one thing, but another deeper issue exists. 

The issue in this case in my opinion would be one of the military's culture. It is admirable and right to say that soldiers ought not to follow illegal orders. However, where's the protection for troops in this situation? What institutions guarantees soldiers' safety and welfare (not rights, not in Singapore) if they make a fuss? I only recall a cursory hour-long treatment of military law delivered one groggy evening in BMT, although I hope this has changed.

We aren't the Bundeswehr in this aspect, unfortunately. The German military's deeds in the Second World War and the ire it gained post facto, not to mention political expediency, led to an entire are of focus within the military quite foreign to most others. Now I don't want to simply praise the German military, and I ask any German readers your forgiveness and guidance if I have mischaracterized it. As far as I understand it, the princples of Befehl und Gehorsam, or the principle of command and obedience were first disseminated in the fifties. In general, it sought to reduce superiors' powers to compel subordinates and encouraged shared responsibility for obedience by subordinates.

For example, if a junior is unsure of his orders, he can verify them with his superior's superior, and can but need not obey in certain situations and must not in others. If the order is illegitimate and he carries it out, he has to take responsibility as well.

It's not just a set of broadly stated 'mission statements', too. I am unclear as to how well it is enforced in day-to-day operations, but there is a genuine commitment to this. For example, the Federal Republic and Germany today has no special military courts - all offences are tried in civilian courts. Such a stated goal can very easily break down, the military being a world apart, so constant care from the civilian sector and of course the military's own leadership is always needed. It may reduce flexibility in some instances, but this is but an aside point.

Stuff like this certainly won't solve being trapped in ire, say, if you do something unpopular but right, or choose not to compromise, but this is one's personal decision and you ought to defend it. It can however provide encouragement to question itself in a constructive manner, and empower conscripts rather than appealing to "man mode". On a more philosophical level, it's asking "why" rather than "how". Deeper change is needed than a judge's announcement and MINDEF press releases, which are simply treated with derision by HardwareZone and the like.

In the end, a refusal to confront such issues simply leads more to practices like displaying your license on the dash in lieu of real organizational shifts.


Frankly, this situation upsets your author because this was 3 3SG instructors in the back of a jeep tearing around the training grounds, one very familiar to me as a former spec. The last line of the article was even worse, and the reporter was clever putting the line about the "orders" in. I can only imagine what was really said.

Wednesday 3 December 2014

What's the market for military history and education?

I was at a speech recently given by a professor I respect greatly about the UK's commemoration of the First World War. He brought up some good points, chief among which is that the overemphasis on the old and staid methods of "remembrance for the dead" rather than trying new approaches.

One thing that was discussed was a gap between academic discussion and public knowledge. The subject at hand was WW1, so what was brought up was the Alan Clarke view of the British army- "lions led by dinosaurs". That view has pretty much been long exploded with the opening of archives in the 1960s onward. This revealed, among other things, a more nuanced story. Commanders genuinely put in their due diligence in finding innovative military methods, but were limited by factors such as poor communications and plain bad luck. Unfortunately, the Blackadder view of silly subalterns and indifferent generals has proved surprisingly hardy.

This brings me to the next point that I found interesting - that enthusiasts of military history consistently underestimate the level of interest that the public has in the endeavour. Not for nothing did the poppy display at the Tower of London attracted an amazing amount of visitors, despite it being  another tried and tested meaning of canonizing the troops.

It's true that warfare is a uniquely emotional issue (and thus also tends to attract its fair share of oddballs), and will have a place in the human imagination higher than most. Perhaps a TV documentary countering the Blackadder story, if successfully funded and promoted, could easily lay this misconception to rest, rather than the million "TANK BATTLE!" series.

Of course, this also depends on the society you are living in and its values/zeitgeist - the view from Stockholm will not be the same as that of St. Petersburg or Singapore.

Nonetheless, the real implication to me is: if practitioners of military history produce good analysis and offerings, their audience may be larger than they expect.

Frankly, it is the profession's fault that there has been an overemphasis on the easily commoditized, glamorous aspects of warfare. See the endless equipment discussions of the merits of jet fighters or rifles, or the hundreds of expensive Osprey tomes, or the hoary old soldier's memoir - real Boys' Own stuff.



The market for this is well-established, and there's nothing wrong with that: Osprey books are great. However, enthusiasts ought not to sell themselves short by focusing on niche elements of war, and instead endeavour to start a conversation on other aspects.

More on this to come.