Thoughts on Belgian intelligence, and the ultimate tragedy of ISIS-inspired terrorism

http://mashable.com/2016/03/22/belgium-brussels-attacks-security-vulnerable/#YLx3UvHEfmqE

http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/brussels-attacks-belgian-intelligence-service-seen-as-weak-link-in-europe-1.2583514

http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/.premium-1.710572

The theme of weak Belgian domestic intelligence and security is a tired old one. It's probably not a mere scapegoat, since people have been warning about it long enough before this. (Since after the Paris attacks, actually.)

I don't understand their domestic context and history enough to analyze it properly. Instead, what came to mind was the thought that any organization ought to prepare for after-action reviews following such incidents, because there are always unknown unknowns. These sorts of things can be easily convened, but it would be better for all stakeholders if the details are discreetly sorted out - for example, how to manage the PR during a public hearing.

More importantly, the paradigm of vaguely-ISIS-inspired opportunistic attacks on nations (Australia, the US, France, Indonesia, now Belgium) is distressing but honestly counterproductive.

They do not strike at anyone's centre of gravity. The world at large retains the ability to do serious damage to ISIS-held lands and sympathizers (or simply prolong the war in Syria), no matter if it's accomplished by the US, EU, the Saudi coalition, or even Russia. If political considerations are overridden, this could be easily done.

Despite the mayhem, these attacks are tactical victories at best and don't do much except raise the stakes. Ideally, terror strikes would be targeted against enemy nations' centers of gravity to hurt them; instead we have violence for violence's sake. (Without some sort of central command, these terrorists are more similar to criminals/extremely violent franchises of a street gang rather than soldiers.)

My argument will fall, however, if the targets are willing to accept/are sensitized to a new normality of occasional attacks, which is still possible! 

It would be more productive to examine whether the tempo is increasing in response to the extreme pressure on ISIS in Syria, or perhaps the seeds planted in these men some years back bearing fruit. Or this Brussels attack could be an anomaly in response to the recent crackdown.

Regarding centers of gravity that are actually affected, it's possible that one centre of gravity is to stoke racial tensions and widen the war. However, to prove this, one would need to demonstrate that the terrorists or their spiritual leaders are actually thinking in such terms, and are welcoming more battle.

P.S.: Thank you for returning after my long hiatus - I recently began full-time employment, which changed my situation rather drastically. I do hope to continue to share my thoughts in a more focused manner.

Before the big boys stick their noses in

I've been watching the Syrian/Iraqi fracas on and off with varying amounts of interest, and the recent Russian involvement has driven home one point for me; namely, once foreign powers get stuck in your local conflicts it tends to go all sorts of ways that might be undesirable for the local players.

How therefore should smaller states and local powers prosecute their goals if a conflict goes hot?

While having alliance partners is useful, and small arms smuggled in by the CIA have become quite de rigeur in recent conflicts, I can't help but think that a steady hand is needed to prevent a loss of agency in an unequal partnership. In the worst case scenario, the government could become nothing more than a proxy, like the Manchurian puppet government in the Second World War.

Even before the situation reaches that stage, local concerns may well be subordinated to wider geopolitics. For example, the US' cut and run in Vietnam came about due to domestic sensibilities.

How, therefore, could this be avoided? Here I am speaking of largely unilateral effort, instead of playing one side against the other, which is also risky.

While obviously there is no one-size-fits-all solution, lots needs to done even before anything kicks off. Some ideas come to mind, such as preparing the "ground" of the local and international arenas for your aims before the conflict, building good PR and actually having a good enough organization to pull that all off, which is mostly common sense. Foreign intervention might even suit some in such cases - limiting myself to Southeast Asian examples, look at East Timor, or Cambodia.

Possibly alliances with other local actors might be useful, although thanks to all parties' limited strength and local concerns this might prove to be more trouble than is worth if there's a lack of a shared vision. Even after masses of aid and government contacts, Saudi Arabia's request for Pakistani involvement in the ongoing Yemeni civil war was turned down, to much frustration from the Saudi front.

Most important would perhaps be picking your damn battles, although that maybe isn't always politically feasible in cases of long-held vendettas, or opportunities that present themselves.

In times of conflict, not only are the above needs intensified, there is also the factor of speed - if you can grab an issue by its horns, and come to grips with it swiftly it could be spun off as a done deal rather than a festering sore attracting global attention, media opportunism, and most of all "think of the children" types. Perhaps in this case I'm a believer that possession is nine tenths of the law in international courts.

Speaking of the world system - the UN, ICJ et al, this gets thorny since large powers like the US and European nations hold sway. This may not be so important, since you may simply have to take the risk of being charged for war crimes several decades later, by then presumably the 'war goals' have been accomplished.

In any case - certainly worth sitting down and planning about, rather than simply hoping for Uncle Sam (or Semyon, as the case may be) to drop in and be Big Brother.

The Singaporean opposition and defence

Even as Singapore's election season nears its end this Friday, defence has not been discussed much - perhaps a bit strange for a sector that takes up a significant proportion of government spending, and one that many Singaporeans are involved in via National Service.

Not many Singaporean political parties have paid heed to defence issues in their manifestos and campaigning. The incumbent PAP's stance and policy on the military defence of Singapore can be taken as given, with no shifts - but the opposition's proposals have been notable in their absence.

The Workers' Party manifesto is the only one to deal at length with the issue of defence and diplomacy, which it astutely examines together. In fact, at first blush, I thought I was reading a collection of civil service working papers, with suggestions such as continued work towards establishing a South China Sea Code of Conduct and managing cyber-security are grounded in real global developments. Threats to our island are immutable, after all, no matter the governing party. (That said, there was a line advocating that Singapore sign the Ottawa treaty banning the use of landmines and cluster munitions. If we truly kept to the letter of that, it would seem to sacrifice much for a measly return.)

The traditional Singaporean opposition approach towards defence has been the theme of 'cuts' - reducing NS time served and the defence budget.

In the spirit of free discussion, these are in all honesty not too far-fetched - it is possible that a reappraisal of Singapore's possible military objectives might lead to an adjustment of capabilities required. More heli- and water- borne light infantry, for instance, instead of heavy armoured units. NS time served has been cut to just about the minimum considered effective for necessary training, but with capability shifts this might change in future decades.

Unfortunately, the Opposition's criticisms often do not come from sound, sober consideration. The defence budget sometimes treated as merely a candy store to be raided. Ultimately, other domestic concerns dominate the debate at present, and defence is dealt with only lightly. This certainly has something to do with a general incompetence regarding military issues, as showcased by Dr Tambyah of the Singapore Democratic Party recently.

Put MOH under the defence ministry: SDP's Tambyah
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)'s Dr Paul Tambyah suggests parking the health ministry under MINDEF after PAP criticised the party's proposal to trim the defence budget by 40%. "Every day more Singaporeans die of heart disease than were killed during Konfrontasi. Every year, more Singaporeans die of cancer than die during the Japanese Occupation. We need to defend our citizens against threats both external to the body and internal." http://bit.ly/1QmpCjB #GE2015
Posted by Channel NewsAsia Singapore on Tuesday, September 8, 2015

Direct link if video does not work.

On the other hand, it does speak to our defence apparatus' relative efficiency and strength as well as the peace prevailing in Southeast Asia that the election campaigns have been more concerned about other domestic issues.

The fact is that defence is not in the news much, if at all - there is perhaps some media reticence on reporting on defence, and its closed nature prevents otherwise interesting stories from breaking.

More comprehensive defence budget reporting, and the continual expanding of defence discussion and debate in Singapore will hopefully address this in future.

The British Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, was not too long ago quoted as saying that there are "no votes in defence". However, even if you are not interested in defence, defence is interested in you, especially if there's not enough of it to go around.

SAF to help out for transport disruptions?

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/talk-of-saf-helping-out-in-rail-incidents-sparks-debate

Funnily enough, in the past two days ST's defence correspondent Mr Jermyn Chow has pushed out one print and four online (one being a reproduction of his print piece) articles on the issue. The comments on some of them pretty much sum up the public mood online.

One more thing I would like to add is that this introduces a 'moral hazard' to transport failures. The fact is that while SMRT's train services have been getting better, many Singaporeans have lost much faith in the company and its leadership. The reasons for this loss of faith may not be good, but while work is being done - and is underway - to address them, they will remain in the short term.

While this is very possibly just the drawer plan to end all drawer plans, its abbreviated reporting did it no favour here - perhaps the correspondent caught a phrase that hadn't been cleared for release and typesetted out in the finest PR prose?

Ultimately, it came across as public resources being used as a crutch for a weak organization.

In closing, it is right that the military stand prepared for civil emergencies; after all, Armour and other units helped out at the Hotel New World incident, and much has been said about the 1983 cable car tragedy.

That said, I'm not too clear on the legalities of the SAF assisting in civil situations - does it have to be formally requested, and who from? I don't believe the Statutes cover it, but I would like to be corrected.

The questions of: is this a serious enough emergency? and Is it warranted to deploy precious military force (for after all, the bulk of the manpower will come from conscripts with limited time in-service, possibly the limited pool of combat fit ones)? have been asked.

Knowing who would have to give the go-ahead will certainly throw light upon how things are run.

Defence suppliers' cycle of dependence

Despite making some killer aircraft in the First World War, Sopwith found the ground cut out from under it in the postwar period. Despite a series of grand plans to adapt to the peacetime market it eventually folded.

Thanks to its niche clientele, defence companies are intensely familiar with a feast/famine situation. When competing for local military business or for an ever more competitive and sometimes even shrinking international markets, clinching a contract can mean a massive gold-plated income stream, and failing to gain one can be disastrous - the losers of the US' next generation bomber project may be forced to scale down their defence-related workforce and thus temporarily bow out of the military aviation market! Firms that are not sufficiently diversified are certainly uniquely vulnerable: no sane company can afford to keep its workforce twiddling its thumbs while it waits for the next big contract - even spare parts and support won't be enough to keep the designers and researchers occupied, unless it is diversified enough to draw upon revenues from other sectors. (Maybe if labour is liquid enough, they can be hired temporarily under contract.)

Unpredictable demand may well worsen the situation: a military supplier and a state would be a fool to enter into a sale without well-written contracts to specify who gets stuck holding the bag in case of cuts or unforseen situations, a la the Russian Mistrals.

Therefore, today, one big argument that governments put forward for "buying local" is the need to keep the local defence industry alive. This is sometimes against the will of militaries and the treasury.

This naturally raises a whole host of concerns; I wasn't aware that the defence budget was to serve as an industrial subsidy, although some western governments doubtless think it is. Subsidies of course come with issues of inefficiency. Big items such as the Japanese F-2 project are glaring examples, but lack of competition threatens to turn certain big concerns into protected sinecures. I'm sure the real everyday toll of industrial protection comes from sluggish support, poor management and the like that affects the service standards and products of defence firms.

As much as I would like to say, "let the free market sort it out - why should defence companies be privileged over any other?" this is a policy beyond the capability (or desire!) of many governments. This is doubly so in the Southeast Asian region.

Ideally, this feast/famine cycle could be 'resolved' not just by clear telegraphing of demand (or forcing a stable 'schedule' of work down buyers' and sellers' throats), but perhaps accepting that most military requirements aren't so special after all, and going 'civilian' whereever one can. If this leads to the military being more open and dependent on the wider market and society, so much the better! No wars were fought purely by the green machine, it always rests upon labour at home.

If subsidies are genuinely a must, focusing on certain key capabilities may be more affordable - small arms and ammunition manufacture, for instance, is well within the reach of most nations.

The alternative - to treat defence companies like immature seedlings that constantly need protection - is unpalatable to everyone. Except those with vested interests in these same firms.

Observations and proposals on the NDP armoured column rehearsal

Some quick points of interest regarding the NDP armoured column rehearsals, which will run every Saturday until the 9th of August:

The vehicles are low-loaded or driven to the form-up point for the column at the carpark next to Leisure Park Kallang overnight, and around 12pm is a good time to see them moving off.

  

The packet information on the vehicles lets one get an idea of the work needed to position even this small cross-section of Singapore's military and civil defence vehicles in place.


As usual, the carpark is not cordoned off, and a fair few members of the public have taken the opportunity to get up close and personal with the column and speak to the soldiers and Home Team personnel manning them.

While vehicle commanders from the Army dismounted to guide their vehicles around tight bends, strangely, the Air Force M113 Igla group negotiated it straightaway rather than stopping to let the vehicle commander out. leading to one or two close scrapes with the pavement. The view isn't the best from the driver's compartment, and it was rather surprising to your author who was trained in armoured infantry. Perhaps it is standard practice in the Air Force, considering the marshallers directing traffic didn't bat an eye.

If you're around town, the column does a turnaround at about 2pm, leaving plenty of opportunity for a second round and views from overhead bridges.

Further and more detailed coverage can be found on the excellent Kementah blog.

Considering that pioneering servicemen are taking part in the parade, I can't help but wonder if an opportunity was missed to bring vehicles now out of service out for the column. I'm perhaps influenced here by the Russian practice of keeping historical vehicles such as T-34 tanks in their Victory Day parades.

Quite apart from their historical value, they would also highlight the changes in the SAF ORBAT and Home Team's capabilities. The infantry, for instance, now has the Terrex to showcase, where in previous years they were mounted on tonners! (The column starts at 53:13, led by the then-new Bionix 1, which has been fully displaced from recent mobile columns.)

I'm not too clear on the state of the vehicles -  I want to say older vehicles are still kept around, but I do know that much of certain fleets have been disposed of. In a pinch sourcing surplus in a pinch M113s and AMX-13s from abroad would not be terribly difficult, although they would need at the very least external visual modifications.

Finding operators and drivers wouldn't be terribly difficult; if not ROD-ed NSmen, regulars could also be tapped. Some of the warrant officers I met in my NSF days had been in armour since the pre-M113 Ultra days. I am sure that such a proposal wouldn't have slipped the committee's mind, but it is a shame that it did not come to pass.

On the subject of NS matters - another thing that's always tickled me about these columns is that NSmen spectators would be perfectly capable of driving and operating a large number of these vehicles, and it was a bit of a shame that this wasn't brought across. I personally felt like giving directions to some of the more beleaguered RSAF M113 drivers. The logistics of, say, manning half the vehicles with NSmen would be something new, but it would be quite a testament to the capabilities of the NS system and speak to the true nature of the Army's order of battle.

Another part of the SG50 NDP I'm looking forward to is the air flypast - post-2000 flypasts have been a bit muted, and this year's one looks like a return to the glory old days. The RSAF is certainly practicing hard here - instead of confining practices to weekends, they are flying almost every day.

Everything but the kitchen sink - some reflections on undergrad history

I recently completed my undergraduate history course - while I have yet to officially graduate, finals exams are behind me.

During the past three years, I had the chance to choose from a menu of papers to read, and when picking them I had an eye towards whether they offered the potential for studying warfare and the military - such as on the US Civil War, or one paper that promised the chance to examine the Wars of the Roses. I also had the opportunity to write an undergrad thesis, which I did on the Singaporean military.

Unfortunately for me, I tended to come away particularly unsatisfied from most of them - it seemed that tutors were ready to cover everything about the war save the war itself. Most inquiry and eventual exam questions, even in papers ostensibly about a conflict, concerned themselves about the origins and effects of conflict itself, rather than studying battle or militaries. At its worst, some authors treated actual war as something akin to a natural disaster that served only to remove territory and important historical figures from the scene. While we might seek to consider the role war played in gender or the economy, the fighting itself sometimes came divorced from our study. In short - it seemed like everything regarding conflict was worth studying, except how to fight and win.

Now, I'll have to admit that I ought to have been more assertive in requesting to cover explicitly military-related aspects, and some papers handled that deftly. I will never forget Dr Gregory from Pembroke, who physically demonstrated the importance of convoying in the First World War with the use of scattered coins. In general I was honestly impressed at the quality of the First World War teaching. Still, I was told once that military history was sort of an 'intellectual dead end', and most discussion on combat and warfare quickly fell off the rails thanks to a general lack of knowledge. I didn't take this to heart, but that genuinely got me thinking about why it was.

Historians write of course based on their own interests, but also with an eye to wider publication, or to aid in solving serious historical questions. The study of war and combat proper seems to me to have acquired a cachet of 'popular history' for the casual reader, or for selected generals to read in Staff colleges.

Why would it not be popular? After all, armed clashes are riveting stuff for good reason, with the lives and stakes involved -  I daresay case-studies of conflict are certainly easier to relate to than most sub-fields of history. In addition, I'd suggest that the hard-science and engineering background of the modern Western and US military establishment has tinged anglophone academic study of the military in rather technical terms, a la Zaloga and other Security Studies works.

Hopefully I'll get to meet more military historians proper in the future and read what I can.