Before the big boys stick their noses in

I've been watching the Syrian/Iraqi fracas on and off with varying amounts of interest, and the recent Russian involvement has driven home one point for me; namely, once foreign powers get stuck in your local conflicts it tends to go all sorts of ways that might be undesirable for the local players.

How therefore should smaller states and local powers prosecute their goals if a conflict goes hot?

While having alliance partners is useful, and small arms smuggled in by the CIA have become quite de rigeur in recent conflicts, I can't help but think that a steady hand is needed to prevent a loss of agency in an unequal partnership. In the worst case scenario, the government could become nothing more than a proxy, like the Manchurian puppet government in the Second World War.

Even before the situation reaches that stage, local concerns may well be subordinated to wider geopolitics. For example, the US' cut and run in Vietnam came about due to domestic sensibilities.

How, therefore, could this be avoided? Here I am speaking of largely unilateral effort, instead of playing one side against the other, which is also risky.

While obviously there is no one-size-fits-all solution, lots needs to done even before anything kicks off. Some ideas come to mind, such as preparing the "ground" of the local and international arenas for your aims before the conflict, building good PR and actually having a good enough organization to pull that all off, which is mostly common sense. Foreign intervention might even suit some in such cases - limiting myself to Southeast Asian examples, look at East Timor, or Cambodia.

Possibly alliances with other local actors might be useful, although thanks to all parties' limited strength and local concerns this might prove to be more trouble than is worth if there's a lack of a shared vision. Even after masses of aid and government contacts, Saudi Arabia's request for Pakistani involvement in the ongoing Yemeni civil war was turned down, to much frustration from the Saudi front.

Most important would perhaps be picking your damn battles, although that maybe isn't always politically feasible in cases of long-held vendettas, or opportunities that present themselves.

In times of conflict, not only are the above needs intensified, there is also the factor of speed - if you can grab an issue by its horns, and come to grips with it swiftly it could be spun off as a done deal rather than a festering sore attracting global attention, media opportunism, and most of all "think of the children" types. Perhaps in this case I'm a believer that possession is nine tenths of the law in international courts.

Speaking of the world system - the UN, ICJ et al, this gets thorny since large powers like the US and European nations hold sway. This may not be so important, since you may simply have to take the risk of being charged for war crimes several decades later, by then presumably the 'war goals' have been accomplished.

In any case - certainly worth sitting down and planning about, rather than simply hoping for Uncle Sam (or Semyon, as the case may be) to drop in and be Big Brother.

The Singaporean opposition and defence

Even as Singapore's election season nears its end this Friday, defence has not been discussed much - perhaps a bit strange for a sector that takes up a significant proportion of government spending, and one that many Singaporeans are involved in via National Service.

Not many Singaporean political parties have paid heed to defence issues in their manifestos and campaigning. The incumbent PAP's stance and policy on the military defence of Singapore can be taken as given, with no shifts - but the opposition's proposals have been notable in their absence.

The Workers' Party manifesto is the only one to deal at length with the issue of defence and diplomacy, which it astutely examines together. In fact, at first blush, I thought I was reading a collection of civil service working papers, with suggestions such as continued work towards establishing a South China Sea Code of Conduct and managing cyber-security are grounded in real global developments. Threats to our island are immutable, after all, no matter the governing party. (That said, there was a line advocating that Singapore sign the Ottawa treaty banning the use of landmines and cluster munitions. If we truly kept to the letter of that, it would seem to sacrifice much for a measly return.)

The traditional Singaporean opposition approach towards defence has been the theme of 'cuts' - reducing NS time served and the defence budget.

In the spirit of free discussion, these are in all honesty not too far-fetched - it is possible that a reappraisal of Singapore's possible military objectives might lead to an adjustment of capabilities required. More heli- and water- borne light infantry, for instance, instead of heavy armoured units. NS time served has been cut to just about the minimum considered effective for necessary training, but with capability shifts this might change in future decades.

Unfortunately, the Opposition's criticisms often do not come from sound, sober consideration. The defence budget sometimes treated as merely a candy store to be raided. Ultimately, other domestic concerns dominate the debate at present, and defence is dealt with only lightly. This certainly has something to do with a general incompetence regarding military issues, as showcased by Dr Tambyah of the Singapore Democratic Party recently.

Put MOH under the defence ministry: SDP's Tambyah
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)'s Dr Paul Tambyah suggests parking the health ministry under MINDEF after PAP criticised the party's proposal to trim the defence budget by 40%. "Every day more Singaporeans die of heart disease than were killed during Konfrontasi. Every year, more Singaporeans die of cancer than die during the Japanese Occupation. We need to defend our citizens against threats both external to the body and internal." http://bit.ly/1QmpCjB #GE2015
Posted by Channel NewsAsia Singapore on Tuesday, September 8, 2015

Direct link if video does not work.

On the other hand, it does speak to our defence apparatus' relative efficiency and strength as well as the peace prevailing in Southeast Asia that the election campaigns have been more concerned about other domestic issues.

The fact is that defence is not in the news much, if at all - there is perhaps some media reticence on reporting on defence, and its closed nature prevents otherwise interesting stories from breaking.

More comprehensive defence budget reporting, and the continual expanding of defence discussion and debate in Singapore will hopefully address this in future.

The British Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, was not too long ago quoted as saying that there are "no votes in defence". However, even if you are not interested in defence, defence is interested in you, especially if there's not enough of it to go around.

SAF to help out for transport disruptions?

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/talk-of-saf-helping-out-in-rail-incidents-sparks-debate

Funnily enough, in the past two days ST's defence correspondent Mr Jermyn Chow has pushed out one print and four online (one being a reproduction of his print piece) articles on the issue. The comments on some of them pretty much sum up the public mood online.

One more thing I would like to add is that this introduces a 'moral hazard' to transport failures. The fact is that while SMRT's train services have been getting better, many Singaporeans have lost much faith in the company and its leadership. The reasons for this loss of faith may not be good, but while work is being done - and is underway - to address them, they will remain in the short term.

While this is very possibly just the drawer plan to end all drawer plans, its abbreviated reporting did it no favour here - perhaps the correspondent caught a phrase that hadn't been cleared for release and typesetted out in the finest PR prose?

Ultimately, it came across as public resources being used as a crutch for a weak organization.

In closing, it is right that the military stand prepared for civil emergencies; after all, Armour and other units helped out at the Hotel New World incident, and much has been said about the 1983 cable car tragedy.

That said, I'm not too clear on the legalities of the SAF assisting in civil situations - does it have to be formally requested, and who from? I don't believe the Statutes cover it, but I would like to be corrected.

The questions of: is this a serious enough emergency? and Is it warranted to deploy precious military force (for after all, the bulk of the manpower will come from conscripts with limited time in-service, possibly the limited pool of combat fit ones)? have been asked.

Knowing who would have to give the go-ahead will certainly throw light upon how things are run.

Defence suppliers' cycle of dependence

Despite making some killer aircraft in the First World War, Sopwith found the ground cut out from under it in the postwar period. Despite a series of grand plans to adapt to the peacetime market it eventually folded.

Thanks to its niche clientele, defence companies are intensely familiar with a feast/famine situation. When competing for local military business or for an ever more competitive and sometimes even shrinking international markets, clinching a contract can mean a massive gold-plated income stream, and failing to gain one can be disastrous - the losers of the US' next generation bomber project may be forced to scale down their defence-related workforce and thus temporarily bow out of the military aviation market! Firms that are not sufficiently diversified are certainly uniquely vulnerable: no sane company can afford to keep its workforce twiddling its thumbs while it waits for the next big contract - even spare parts and support won't be enough to keep the designers and researchers occupied, unless it is diversified enough to draw upon revenues from other sectors. (Maybe if labour is liquid enough, they can be hired temporarily under contract.)

Unpredictable demand may well worsen the situation: a military supplier and a state would be a fool to enter into a sale without well-written contracts to specify who gets stuck holding the bag in case of cuts or unforseen situations, a la the Russian Mistrals.

Therefore, today, one big argument that governments put forward for "buying local" is the need to keep the local defence industry alive. This is sometimes against the will of militaries and the treasury.

This naturally raises a whole host of concerns; I wasn't aware that the defence budget was to serve as an industrial subsidy, although some western governments doubtless think it is. Subsidies of course come with issues of inefficiency. Big items such as the Japanese F-2 project are glaring examples, but lack of competition threatens to turn certain big concerns into protected sinecures. I'm sure the real everyday toll of industrial protection comes from sluggish support, poor management and the like that affects the service standards and products of defence firms.

As much as I would like to say, "let the free market sort it out - why should defence companies be privileged over any other?" this is a policy beyond the capability (or desire!) of many governments. This is doubly so in the Southeast Asian region.

Ideally, this feast/famine cycle could be 'resolved' not just by clear telegraphing of demand (or forcing a stable 'schedule' of work down buyers' and sellers' throats), but perhaps accepting that most military requirements aren't so special after all, and going 'civilian' whereever one can. If this leads to the military being more open and dependent on the wider market and society, so much the better! No wars were fought purely by the green machine, it always rests upon labour at home.

If subsidies are genuinely a must, focusing on certain key capabilities may be more affordable - small arms and ammunition manufacture, for instance, is well within the reach of most nations.

The alternative - to treat defence companies like immature seedlings that constantly need protection - is unpalatable to everyone. Except those with vested interests in these same firms.

Observations and proposals on the NDP armoured column rehearsal

Some quick points of interest regarding the NDP armoured column rehearsals, which will run every Saturday until the 9th of August:

The vehicles are low-loaded or driven to the form-up point for the column at the carpark next to Leisure Park Kallang overnight, and around 12pm is a good time to see them moving off.

  

The packet information on the vehicles lets one get an idea of the work needed to position even this small cross-section of Singapore's military and civil defence vehicles in place.


As usual, the carpark is not cordoned off, and a fair few members of the public have taken the opportunity to get up close and personal with the column and speak to the soldiers and Home Team personnel manning them.

While vehicle commanders from the Army dismounted to guide their vehicles around tight bends, strangely, the Air Force M113 Igla group negotiated it straightaway rather than stopping to let the vehicle commander out. leading to one or two close scrapes with the pavement. The view isn't the best from the driver's compartment, and it was rather surprising to your author who was trained in armoured infantry. Perhaps it is standard practice in the Air Force, considering the marshallers directing traffic didn't bat an eye.

If you're around town, the column does a turnaround at about 2pm, leaving plenty of opportunity for a second round and views from overhead bridges.

Further and more detailed coverage can be found on the excellent Kementah blog.

Considering that pioneering servicemen are taking part in the parade, I can't help but wonder if an opportunity was missed to bring vehicles now out of service out for the column. I'm perhaps influenced here by the Russian practice of keeping historical vehicles such as T-34 tanks in their Victory Day parades.

Quite apart from their historical value, they would also highlight the changes in the SAF ORBAT and Home Team's capabilities. The infantry, for instance, now has the Terrex to showcase, where in previous years they were mounted on tonners! (The column starts at 53:13, led by the then-new Bionix 1, which has been fully displaced from recent mobile columns.)

I'm not too clear on the state of the vehicles -  I want to say older vehicles are still kept around, but I do know that much of certain fleets have been disposed of. In a pinch sourcing surplus in a pinch M113s and AMX-13s from abroad would not be terribly difficult, although they would need at the very least external visual modifications.

Finding operators and drivers wouldn't be terribly difficult; if not ROD-ed NSmen, regulars could also be tapped. Some of the warrant officers I met in my NSF days had been in armour since the pre-M113 Ultra days. I am sure that such a proposal wouldn't have slipped the committee's mind, but it is a shame that it did not come to pass.

On the subject of NS matters - another thing that's always tickled me about these columns is that NSmen spectators would be perfectly capable of driving and operating a large number of these vehicles, and it was a bit of a shame that this wasn't brought across. I personally felt like giving directions to some of the more beleaguered RSAF M113 drivers. The logistics of, say, manning half the vehicles with NSmen would be something new, but it would be quite a testament to the capabilities of the NS system and speak to the true nature of the Army's order of battle.

Another part of the SG50 NDP I'm looking forward to is the air flypast - post-2000 flypasts have been a bit muted, and this year's one looks like a return to the glory old days. The RSAF is certainly practicing hard here - instead of confining practices to weekends, they are flying almost every day.

Everything but the kitchen sink - some reflections on undergrad history

I recently completed my undergraduate history course - while I have yet to officially graduate, finals exams are behind me.

During the past three years, I had the chance to choose from a menu of papers to read, and when picking them I had an eye towards whether they offered the potential for studying warfare and the military - such as on the US Civil War, or one paper that promised the chance to examine the Wars of the Roses. I also had the opportunity to write an undergrad thesis, which I did on the Singaporean military.

Unfortunately for me, I tended to come away particularly unsatisfied from most of them - it seemed that tutors were ready to cover everything about the war save the war itself. Most inquiry and eventual exam questions, even in papers ostensibly about a conflict, concerned themselves about the origins and effects of conflict itself, rather than studying battle or militaries. At its worst, some authors treated actual war as something akin to a natural disaster that served only to remove territory and important historical figures from the scene. While we might seek to consider the role war played in gender or the economy, the fighting itself sometimes came divorced from our study. In short - it seemed like everything regarding conflict was worth studying, except how to fight and win.

Now, I'll have to admit that I ought to have been more assertive in requesting to cover explicitly military-related aspects, and some papers handled that deftly. I will never forget Dr Gregory from Pembroke, who physically demonstrated the importance of convoying in the First World War with the use of scattered coins. In general I was honestly impressed at the quality of the First World War teaching. Still, I was told once that military history was sort of an 'intellectual dead end', and most discussion on combat and warfare quickly fell off the rails thanks to a general lack of knowledge. I didn't take this to heart, but that genuinely got me thinking about why it was.

Historians write of course based on their own interests, but also with an eye to wider publication, or to aid in solving serious historical questions. The study of war and combat proper seems to me to have acquired a cachet of 'popular history' for the casual reader, or for selected generals to read in Staff colleges.

Why would it not be popular? After all, armed clashes are riveting stuff for good reason, with the lives and stakes involved -  I daresay case-studies of conflict are certainly easier to relate to than most sub-fields of history. In addition, I'd suggest that the hard-science and engineering background of the modern Western and US military establishment has tinged anglophone academic study of the military in rather technical terms, a la Zaloga and other Security Studies works.

Hopefully I'll get to meet more military historians proper in the future and read what I can.

The early formulation of Singapore's defence policy

There are a couple of assumptions regarding post-independence Singapore's military history that die hard. I wrote my thesis on Singaporean defence in the post-independence period just last term, and to be honest it was really in reaction to some of these.

It was hardly inevitable to go from a practically disarmed island nation to the 'poison shrimp' concept, and later on to today's amply equipped SAF and its potential for preemptive strikes.

Firstly, the notion that Singapore was "abandoned" in defence after 1965 is seductive but false. The United Kingdom certainly caught the Singaporean leadership by surprise when it moved up its withdrawal schedule due to domestic concerns, with the PAP government ramping up negotiations behind the scenes as soon as it heard word and PM Lee Kuan Yew flying to London for talks as soon as the news broke publicly.

Nevertheless, the UK and the ANZAC states still had a vested interest in the stability of Malaysia and Singapore. There were a veritable raft of reasons. The UK still had commercial interests in Malaysia, with mining and plantation even more important in economically depressed times. The specter of Konfrontasi was fading, but  having handed power over to friendly local elites, Whitehall and civil servants in London and on the ground in Southeast Asia would certainly do all they could to ensure their safety against Communist or other subversion. There was also the possibility of using military facilities in Singapore (or Malaysia) for force projection.  As for the ANZAC nations, the concept of 'forward defence' of fighting the Communist menace in Southeast Asia before it reached Australian or New Zealand shores was in vogue.

Thus, the Five Power Defence Arrangements were negotiated to provide a framework for a joint Malaysian-Singaporean defence. Its chief instrument was a joint Malaysian-Singaporean integrated air defence system, aided by an Australian squadron of fighters, and for some years British and ANZAC troops deployed to the region and conducted exercises. Singapore's fledging military also benefited substantially from UK and Commonwealth collaboration for many years to come. In addition, British and other Commonwealth arms companies were eager to do business with Singapore. The island could have continued its defence collaboration with the UK/Commonwealth. Further collaboration was eventually abandoned in favour with other more cooperative partners, but to say that Singapore built up its defences in reaction to a 'British abandonment' is only a very small part of the story.

Secondly, would the territorial integrity of the island nation really be in question? We are constrained by a lack of information. The possibility of some sort of coup de main still remained, but the idee fixe common today of some sort of aggressive 'running amok' southwards would seem unlikely.

Having excised the 'cancer' of Communist Chinese subversion from the Federation by unanimously expelling Singapore, the expectation was that an independent Singapore would prove unviable and perhaps seek re-entry to Malaysia on Kuala Lumpur's terms. Some sort of forceful takeover would also be complicated by the presence of British and ANZAC troops. Besides, in the immediate term Malaysian troops were all over Singapore and Singapore's two infantry battalions had to divested of Malaysian personnel upon independence. With the mainland controlling Singapore's access to water and trade, was there really a need to even consider force?

Another thing I'd like to point out: even in separation, the governments of both Malaysia and Singapore still retained some enthusiasm for joint defence efforts, even if only in the name of defraying costs. The government in KL was not keen on devoting large amounts of GDP to defence, and a proposal was floated for Singapore to focus on providing naval defence for both nations, for example. The Lee cabinet's seeming profligacy in defence spending was greeted with some alarm by British Foreign Office negotiators!

The myopia of deterrence

I've got coursework out of the way for the moment, and had this quick thought while catching up on news.

This is perhaps rather a basic question, but deterrence can't be considered in isolation. Militaries, being concerned with security, are particularly vulnerable to biased assessments of their own deterrence value. In Singapore, where the full might of the Army in particular will never be seen save full mobilization, I suspect the military is particularly prone to seeing itself as a 'doomsday weapon'.

An example of this intellectual laziness is in considering nuclear deterrence. MAD is sometimes dealt with as a field unto itself and held up as the supreme example of deterrence: the possession of nuclear weapons deters the escalation of conflicts. The destructive force of these weapons certainly went a long way in stopping superpower brinksmanship after some initial teething pains.

Still, consider a history that could have gone very differently. A Korean War where the US dropped one or two nuclear devices on the 'ChiComs' might have gotten the world used to kilo- or mega-deaths, and that the use of nuclear weapons was to be expected. Such a capability deterred war but no more than dreadnoughts or machine guns deterred war.

Such weapons made war more horrific and forced nations to build up the relevant capabilities to compete, but as soon as willingness to put lives on the line overcame merely material considerations they were moot. I won't even go into the obvious consideration that both sides of the Cold War simply sought other means to assail the other.

In the Singaporean context, Dr Bernard Loo has very simply applied the 'deterrence paradox' to Singapore multiple times - by definition it is difficult to prove that deterrence works. The pure existence of a military force does not mean that it has accomplished its mission.

To give a few other weaknesses of the argument for military deterrence; when an potential aggressor nation seeks to enforce its claims upon another, internal reasons for doing so are likely equally as important as external. Argentina pursued its claims over the Falklands partly due to the need for internal stability, and today China's claims over the South China Sea are partly motivated by internal politicking. Political scientists' models will definitely prove instructive here.

Moreover, purely military force may not be able to exercise control over overseas regions that may prove vital to national safety. For example, investment partners in the Riau Islands and Brunei provide the massively overdeveloped island city of Singapore with important materiel. As Huxley writes, it's possible that armed force may one day be deployed to protect those vital jugulars someday, but it's clear that at present political means rather than explicitly military means secure their safety.

The purpose of a military, as always, is as a useful tool discharging a variety of functions, just like a police service, fire service or education service. Even in defeat the institution of a military can serve the role of a national rallying point - see the Free French, or more recently the Kuwati military in 1991. The military does itself a disservice by overly focusing on one aspect of its existence.

Security enthusiasts ought also overcome this strategic myopia - I suspect it arises out of the inner conflict between not wanting to see the military used, yet being proud of the national project of building armed force.

What will be Singapore's next defining military export?

Singapore's indigenous arms industry is pretty successful by Southeast Asian standards. Say what you may about it, but the ST group of companies has gone beyond small arms and equipment maintenance, venturing into improving and finally developing entire weapons systems.

While exports have always been something of a sideshow, there have been several products that went on to achieve notable overseas sales. These have mostly stemmed out of breakthroughs made for Singapore's own armed forces. Quite interestingly, in the 1980s Singapore was for a time a global leader in AMX-13 and A4 Skyhawk upgrades. Among other successful exports have been patrol craft/boats, mortars and possibly ammunition.

A certain market also exists for refurbished ex-Singaporean weapons. For example, Fennec recce helicopters were reexported to Chad in 2008, and 120mm mortars to Sri Lanka in 2000.


The question really is whether there is a new product Singapore can hope to bring to the table. What is our new AMX-13? Our new A4? The Leopard 2 market is already saturated with upgrades from the West, and the same could be said for aircraft jamming pods and equipment. Upgrades to our Formidables and submarines could be possible, but the market for that is rather small. Not many use La Fayette class ships, and "tropicalisation" of submarines will be limited to the Southeast Asian market.

If I were pressed to tell you what's Singapore's present military export success, I honestly wouldn't be able to say. Lots of stuff has certainly been marketed - the Terrex, the SAR 21 rifle and ST Marine ship designs have all been pushed at trade fairs, in informal marketing, and so on. Singapore has a niche in low-cost lightweight field artillery, but has been stymied recently in India.

Interestingly, Singaporean small arms have never achieved much export success. The Ultimax light machine gun, designed by the famous Jim Sullivan, was perhaps the nation's greatest hope. When it hit the market in the late 1970s - early 1980s it had several unique qualities. The marketing focused on it being lightest LMG bar none at the time, with a clever campaign describing how it was light enough even for Asian women to handle. It was also relatively cheap and came with the Jim Sullivan brand-name.

 A simple googling of the name would also find much praise of the Ultimax from American gunowners even today - there are a few samples that were brought there still floating around the American market.  Nevertheless, it failed to strike pay dirt.

Small arms are a difficult market to compete in. Most nations with a decent industrial capacity should be able to make their own. It would have been unimaginable for the USMC to choose the Ultimax for their new squad automatic weapon over local manufacturers with which it had an enduring relationship with, for example. In something common to all weapons purchases, even if nations import they may well look to using weapons purchases to curry favour with a country instead, and the qualities of the gun become irrelevant.

There are exceptions, such as Jordan purchasing T91 rifles from Taiwan, but those often come about via strong defence diplomacy.

This is at its core a business question as much as it is a defence one, and I'm sure ST executives and others in the business of setting industrial policy in Singapore are well appraised of the global arms market and how Singapore must position itself. Personally, due to the nature of decision making, I'd say that in the military sphere defence diplomacy and strong marketing are just as important as the quality of the product itself. I'd daresay the Bronco sale to the United Kingdom, in response to an urgent requirement, was one of these.

Nevertheless, with the equipment which the SAF is using, future export prospects seem particularly dim.

Musings on 'peace advocacy' in popular culture

In lieu of a proper update;

I was in a bookshop during lunch reading some anti-war books warning about the bifecta of "modern culture" and the "military cultural complex" and how they interact to drive us toward destruction.

To be honest, I don't agree with most of their conclusions. For example, a lot of these writers - whose names I should have taken down - make the assumption that an interest in warfare (and killing, apparently) is something to be stamped out. In my opinion, for a society to have people interested in its defence is no bad thing, no worse than a lot of other activities out there.

However, I do think it's important to have these pundits around. In the Western world, military showdowns as a first choice to resolve inter-state disputes have lost much their shine after the two World Wars, and I personally think that's good. Such advocates often mean well, and their arguments are certainly needed in modern society.