Tuesday, 29 April 2014

The demise of linear frontlines

Very often in military planning there is a temptation to draw straight lines and sectors for one's own forces, denoting clear boundaries. Company A advances along this block, B the one adjacent, C the one further down, and so on. It gives the very Napoleonic image of troops drawn up shoulder to shoulder.

Equally often this image is false; there are simply often not enough bodies on the ground at any given time to wholly secure an imagined "frontline". For nations with shrinking armies - such as Singapore, where the phenomena of a smaller combat-fit force is a reality - this is even more so.

As has been made clear in the much-vaunted "3G Army" campaign, the Singaporean army has sought technology-based solutions to overcome this lack of bodies. On the frontline, there is the "SAF in a backpack" integration of artillery and airforce strike assets with the frontline soldier, gadgets such as improved nightvision and unmanned ground sensors to replace pickets. Unmanned supply vehicles and engineer assets are also perhaps still in the offing, if this (admittedly old) video is any guide. These technologies understandably take a long time to mature.



This blog however submits that planning and a shift in mindsets are equally valid. In an era where there will never be enough troops on the ground, the idea that there is a fixed frontline, composed of units standing shoulder to shoulder, should be abandoned.

Instead of a contiguous front, a model of clusters of men continuously on the move may be more useful. The fighting companies, followed by their associated artillery, air defence and logistical teams. (Defense and Freedom does a better job of elucidating such concepts than I.)

This will require some readjustments. The front is a leaky one, and there is a necessity for all-round defence rather than just frontal ones. Lip service is always paid to such an endeavour but it genuinely has to be emphasized that the army is a group of clusters on the move, not a sanitising front and safe zone behind.

The preparedness and equipment of "rear-area" units such as artillery, air defence, headquarters and logistics ones may have to be examined as well. If enemy light armour breaks through the thin frontage of say an infantry battalion, will the battalion combat service support troops have sufficient training and weapons to see the threat off? Your author is reminded of an anecdote he heard from a Finnish conscript, where an "OPFOR" (opposition forces) SISU personnel carrier somehow snuck through the lines of a unit's rifle companies and wrought havoc on the unprepared headquarters company, before it was mercifully driven off by some lucky simulated rocket shots! Do Singaporean combat units have a brace of MATADOR rockets in the back of the headquarters trucks?

Perhaps (for tactical planning purposes) it may be a good reminder as a matter of staff practice to represent one's units as ovals on the map, not as a continous frontline.

Such changes in practice may matter even more than technology, and its benefits will be apparent even sooner.

Thursday, 3 April 2014

Japan lifts self-imposed ban on arms sales

It might have been an April Fool, but Japan has lifted its self-imposed ban on arms exports, which has existed in legal form since the '60s. Exceptions have been made in the past for technology transfer, but the Cabinet's approval of this new legislation removes the 1967 blanket ban.

Japan's new Type 10 MBT - built to be lightweight
OH-1 "Ninja" reconnaissance helicopter - the eyes of Japan's attack helicopter fleet, meant to tank-hunt in its mountainous terrain
This is potentially unpopular with the Japanese populace and is already stirring ire with the region, but a myriad of positive effects spring to mind.

The most obvious one is profits if Japanese defence firms can sell their arms abroad. A rosy picture could potentially be drawn; The Type 96 APC (also known as the Maneuver Combat Vehicle) may prove popular with nations interested in building up a fast wheeled armoured vehicle fleet. The "Hand Arrow" man-portable SAM could compete against the Igla and the Stinger. We may even see the US-2 maritime patrol aircraft, one of the few military flying boats, exported. This may be soon - India has previously shown interest in them.

Type 96 APC
Type-91 "Hand Arrow" MANPAD
US-2 flying boat

More urbanely, ammunition and other military kit such as webbing could be sold abroad, netting a steady flow of income. Surplus to requirements kit such as older tanks could be sold as well.

However, Japanese firms will need to manage their lack of experience, adapting items made for JSDF requirements for overseas users, and other factors; this is ultimately a very commercial issue. Then again, the Japanese name for quality may well rub off. The nation may do well to learn from others such as Brazil's Embraer.

It may be worth establishing a bureau under the Ministry of Defence or Trade to aid firms in this; but these rapidly get into bed with firms if not properly policed.

Secondly, it is arguable whether military sales increase influence, but they certainly can turn out to be another tool for the Japanese foreign service.

Most interestingly, this opening up of the industry will allow firms and the nation to more readily fund new projects. The controversial Mitsubishi F-2 fighter program, aimed at producing an improved and affordable F-16 type fighter, ended up being an expensive but disappointing aircraft. (Sadly, a quarter of the fleet was lost in the 2011 tsunami). Similarly, an attempt to export the Type 10 MBT's remarkable engine to Turkey foundered on the now repealed laws. It has been argued that the cost borne by the Japanese taxpayer would fall if firms were able to develop products jointly with overseas partners and sell beyond the JSDF.

Quietly, Japan has been pursuing a next-generation stealth fighter, the AD-X "Shinshin" (心神), which may have been a gambit to pressure the US to export the F-22 to the JASDF. Its immense potential cost - much of the Japanese defence budget for very few airframes - would seem to rule out its adoption by the Japanese military, and reduce it to no more than a pawn the stealth sales wars. However, if Japanese stealth and fighter technology can be sold abroad as a successor (or less likely, as a competitor) to the F-35 fighter, it may be worth watching this plane.

ATD-X, possibly a mockup

Perhaps we may know it as the F-3 someday.