Camp justice - we need more than legal statements

National servicemen do not need to obey manifestly illegal or unlawful orders, says judge

This case could potentially have been a very explosive one. Like it or not, the G-Wagen incident
involved spurious orders and unit culture and could have become a catchall for something many Singaporean conscripts would have experienced. The fact that a five-day safety timeout was ordered back then in 2012 might also mean that an astute staff team realized that deep issues had made themselves felt despite the SAF's avowed strong safety culture. 

MB-290 type jeep much like that involved

Nonetheless, the judge in this case has focused on the somewhat obvious principle that NSFs (conscripts) need not obey manifestly illegal orders. He even called on the officer representing Calvin Tan, the soldier driving the jeep, to "get the message out that national servicemen need not obey any such order."

(Admirably, the conducting officer has been charged as well.)

A "weak safety culture", as uncovered by the committee of inquiry, is one thing, but another deeper issue exists. 

The issue in this case in my opinion would be one of the military's culture. It is admirable and right to say that soldiers ought not to follow illegal orders. However, where's the protection for troops in this situation? What institutions guarantees soldiers' safety and welfare (not rights, not in Singapore) if they make a fuss? I only recall a cursory hour-long treatment of military law delivered one groggy evening in BMT, although I hope this has changed.

We aren't the Bundeswehr in this aspect, unfortunately. The German military's deeds in the Second World War and the ire it gained post facto, not to mention political expediency, led to an entire are of focus within the military quite foreign to most others. Now I don't want to simply praise the German military, and I ask any German readers your forgiveness and guidance if I have mischaracterized it. As far as I understand it, the princples of Befehl und Gehorsam, or the principle of command and obedience were first disseminated in the fifties. In general, it sought to reduce superiors' powers to compel subordinates and encouraged shared responsibility for obedience by subordinates.

For example, if a junior is unsure of his orders, he can verify them with his superior's superior, and can but need not obey in certain situations and must not in others. If the order is illegitimate and he carries it out, he has to take responsibility as well.

It's not just a set of broadly stated 'mission statements', too. I am unclear as to how well it is enforced in day-to-day operations, but there is a genuine commitment to this. For example, the Federal Republic and Germany today has no special military courts - all offences are tried in civilian courts. Such a stated goal can very easily break down, the military being a world apart, so constant care from the civilian sector and of course the military's own leadership is always needed. It may reduce flexibility in some instances, but this is but an aside point.

Stuff like this certainly won't solve being trapped in ire, say, if you do something unpopular but right, or choose not to compromise, but this is one's personal decision and you ought to defend it. It can however provide encouragement to question itself in a constructive manner, and empower conscripts rather than appealing to "man mode". On a more philosophical level, it's asking "why" rather than "how". Deeper change is needed than a judge's announcement and MINDEF press releases, which are simply treated with derision by HardwareZone and the like.

In the end, a refusal to confront such issues simply leads more to practices like displaying your license on the dash in lieu of real organizational shifts.

Frankly, this situation upsets your author because this was 3 3SG instructors in the back of a jeep tearing around the training grounds, one very familiar to me as a former spec. The last line of the article was even worse, and the reporter was clever putting the line about the "orders" in. I can only imagine what was really said.

What's the market for military history and education?

I was at a speech recently given by a professor I respect greatly about the UK's commemoration of the First World War. He brought up some good points, chief among which is that the overemphasis on the old and staid methods of "remembrance for the dead" rather than trying new approaches.

One thing that was discussed was a gap between academic discussion and public knowledge. The subject at hand was WW1, so what was brought up was the Alan Clarke view of the British army- "lions led by dinosaurs". That view has pretty much been long exploded with the opening of archives in the 1960s onward. This revealed, among other things, a more nuanced story. Commanders genuinely put in their due diligence in finding innovative military methods, but were limited by factors such as poor communications and plain bad luck. Unfortunately, the Blackadder view of silly subalterns and indifferent generals has proved surprisingly hardy.

This brings me to the next point that I found interesting - that enthusiasts of military history consistently underestimate the level of interest that the public has in the endeavour. Not for nothing did the poppy display at the Tower of London attracted an amazing amount of visitors, despite it being  another tried and tested meaning of canonizing the troops.

It's true that warfare is a uniquely emotional issue (and thus also tends to attract its fair share of oddballs), and will have a place in the human imagination higher than most. Perhaps a TV documentary countering the Blackadder story, if successfully funded and promoted, could easily lay this misconception to rest, rather than the million "TANK BATTLE!" series.

Of course, this also depends on the society you are living in and its values/zeitgeist - the view from Stockholm will not be the same as that of St. Petersburg or Singapore.

Nonetheless, the real implication to me is: if practitioners of military history produce good analysis and offerings, their audience may be larger than they expect.

Frankly, it is the profession's fault that there has been an overemphasis on the easily commoditized, glamorous aspects of warfare. See the endless equipment discussions of the merits of jet fighters or rifles, or the hundreds of expensive Osprey tomes, or the hoary old soldier's memoir - real Boys' Own stuff.

The market for this is well-established, and there's nothing wrong with that: Osprey books are great. However, enthusiasts ought not to sell themselves short by focusing on niche elements of war, and instead endeavour to start a conversation on other aspects.

More on this to come.

"Tank country"

The phrase "X nation is not tank country" is one that refuses to die. The orthodox view that urban and built-up areas are no good for tanks and armoured vehicles, for example, is often one of the axioms taught in militaries. Most Singaporeans will even encounter it in school, with the British assessment that the plantations and poor roads of 1930s Malaya were inhospitable for tanks, and thus failing to prepare for the light Japanese Chi-Ha and Ha-Gos that they faced in 1942. This is also a serious problem for armchair generals and analysts.

It's inevitable that received wisdom be distilled down to simple precepts, but this is rather regrettable.

This memetic behaviour certainly has its reasons - armour excels in mobile firepower, independent movement and dominating large tracts of terrain, among other speed-related precepts, and operating in closed terrain or ones lacking roads can be a dangerous affair.

Moreover, logistics vehicles that must follow the armour are often not tracked.

However, this dismissal of areas like mountains, urban terrain, forests and such as poor 'tank country' runs at odds with historical counterexamples. One doesn't even need to get into obscure examples - the US Marines in Fallujah moved in with plenty of tank support, using the combination of armour and firepower of Abrams tanks to destroy strongpoints and buildings. The after-action report detailing the carefully prescribed dance of infantry and tanks covering one another is rather stunning, albeit somewhat incredible. The German attack through the Ardennes in 1940 took place in an area both mountainous and forested, and with a river crossing to boot.

Terrain is but a problem to be overcome via engineering or planning. For example, if one's engineers are adept at civil engineering, gravel could be laid to help one's wheeled lorries transport supplies forward.

Even a platoon of armour here and there where least expected could do quite some damage - see the use of two troops of Scorpion tanks in the Falklands war at the long end of a logistical chain.

As a corollary to staff thought, the more pertinent question would perhaps be - is it worth taking the precautions and/or adding the infrastructure that will allow armour to enter?

Wanted - A historical perspective on volunteering for war abroad

The fighter, drawn by ideology, righteousness and perhaps curiosity about violence, arranges transport to the epicenter of conflict. He or his group leader gets in touch with local fixers, who bring them further in from regional staging areas, crossing the border with the benefit of local knowledge.

By now, almost 15 years after the beginning of the war on terror, the dynamics of how volunteers and arms make their way from all over the world to armed paramilitary and terror groups ought to be well known. It can be quite a market - Mujahideen moved into Chechnya in the 1990s insurgency, and now Chechen fighters are making themselves felt abroad.

The Islamic State group has been the most recent target of this hand-wringing. The chief worry that is captivating media would be efforts to keep youth from travelling to the Middle East to join this group. This has been largely justified by a two-pronged approach: first, howling that returned militants may be a threat, and second a vague idea of weakening the IS by depriving them of warm bodies and the symbolic participation of international members.

Surprisingly, I've found quite little in mainstream media of historical comparisons between IS and other similar operations in the past. To Europeans, the most direct comparison of youth flooding to a nation to serve in conflict would likely be the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War.

For example, the issue of "returning fighters" was also grappled with as they began to be disbanded under international mediation, and after some diehards left only as the war wound up. In particular, the UK was concerned of IRA-linked Irish fighters that might possibly contribute to the low-level conflict in Northern Ireland. Quite some returning fighters indeed remained involved in British socialist politics, some with personal plans for armed revolution. In the United States, veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, while allowed to return, were viewed as security risks.

Nearer to our time, leaving aside the obvious comparisons to other Islamic terror groups, some sort of comparison could be made with international terrorism and mercenary work of the 1980s. I am a bit pressed to think of any parallels in the past - perhaps the Crusades, or medical volunteering in the Victorian wars such as Crimea.

The greatest change from then seems to me to be modern communications technology that allows interested candidates to self-organize. (Whether the internet is any more effective than the underground socialist newspapers of old though is something worth considering.)

Certainly there will be constants. The arms are probably more important than the men - no matter how motivated, going abroad to a new locale to fight will require acclimatizing yourself to a new set of conditions. One common approach to solving this issue I would look out for would be an acclimatization period in rear areas of the front, or simply putting international fighters together in a composite unit much like IS has done.

A worthy sociological comparison could be made with the modern trend of "voluntourism", with first world youth heading to impoverished areas of Africa to volunteer. On the face of it these activities may seem to attract opposite ends of the socioeconomic spectrum, but there certainly are similarities - interest in seeing the world, poor information on the complexities of their destination (for some), the importance of a foreign face to the destination region...

Singapore's armoured vehicles, part 2 - Some stay the same

This a continuation of my previous post on changes your author has observed in the Singaporean armoured vehicle fleet and doctrine. This short piece will instead focus on some AFV-related priorities of the Army and also the Armour formation.

Firstly, a complete set of mechanized equipment from logistics to artillery carriers to tanks. It goes without saying that the very existence of an independent "Armour" formation that owns complete units, rather than being simply a training command for vehicle operators, speaks volumes of the highly conventional concept of operations - as a combined, fully mechanized armoured fist. A full array of equipment to this end will thus continually be required - motorized combat support (artillery, air defence), service support (logistics), and the actual combatants.

Primus self-propelled gun

Moreover, the SAF has always maintained something of an armour superiority over its neighbours. The historical existence of a heavy-for-the-region tank force is also an open secret. The "T" main battle tanks served the nation for many years but have apparently been retired with the introduction of the Leopard 2 MBTs. However, in a process first floated by Tim Huxley in his classic introduction to Singapore's military forces, military spending in Southeast Asian nations has increased and neighbours are capable of fielding more capable MBTs. In this light, a superiority may be sought through a variety of methods.

This is somewhat speculative - but one thing that has supposedly remained constant is the need for a light tank (fighting vehicle?). I wouldn't have been aware of this if not for a low-level online murmurings of "MLC 30" vehicles for the SAF, MLC referring presumably to "military load classification" and 30 being 30 tons. Certainly there has been a niche for lightweight and small armour for the SAF. This is not really for the conventional purpose of airmobility, but for being small and light enough to navigate between trees of plantations and use unimproved bridges at speed. With the retirement of the SM1 (AMX-13) light tanks there has been a gap in this capability, and perhaps there might be a revival of this at some point.

The cult of the "operators"

Military topics of public interest come and go. The Anglo-German dreadnaught race saw a public mania for naval armaments, summed up by the slogan "we want eight and we won't wait", and newspapers publishing Royal Navy gunnery results on the front pages.

The latest fad certainly seems to be that of the "operator" - the clandestine commando secret O-G-A soldier who works in the deeper than black field. This glamour also applies to mercenaries and security contractors, to an extent.

To be fair, human interest and a hero cult has always captivated people - it certainly beats reading about the life and times of a cruise missile. The United States has always had a bit of an individualistic cult of pilots, perhaps due to savvy marketing and even Top Gun. In contrast, tankmen working together as a band of brothers seem to have been more popular in the USSR and other eastern bloc nations, a fact that somewhat persists today with Russian youth's great love of World of Tanks(!)

It's moreover a fruit of the shadowy, grinding wars worldwide - when did a carrier last fly off an alpha strike? In fact it could be said that the role of the infantry in doing tasks that require a decidedly human touch - the vast amount of things that fall under "counterinsurgency" - has never been more prominent.

A ring-fenced body of troops also offers plausible deniability for special activities and experimentation.

Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that one needs to be wary of the cult of the operator just like any other.

Firstly, the influence of the operators and their mindsets is certainly useful but cannot be elevated needlessly. Here we run into the age-old problem of endorsement and public relations. The "politicized SEAL" is a new element in American politics, for example. Just to name some recent incidents, much has been made of the Osama operation and the Operation Red Wings debacle, plus corresponding movies.

In a more military, bureaucratic sense, as the SF cadre gets into positions of military leadership they become another entrenched interest who may wish to protect their special prerogative like any other. It's not that commandoes won't be able to command, say, an artillery brigade or vice versa. It's a management theory question - while another set of expertise is welcomed, empire-building can ensue despite the best of intentions.

Leadership should additionally be careful of the mindset that certain missions such as long-range recce is the sole domain of special units. In theory, certain skills identified with "special forces" could and should be distributed more widely among the wider body of conventional troops. The average infantry unit could do a lot more - not all US trainers are special forces. These would include training of local units, for instance, simple hostage rescue and aggressive patrolling and close observation in the face of the enemy. In a wider war, a small cadre of specialists will be very quickly run through, and perhaps a greater dispersion of skill will be of more utility.

An amusing side effect on the overfocus on the prestige of SF is a mushrooming number of all whom are termed "special" -  the term can be quite meaningless, and one would do well to exercise caution. I do agree that by all means dole it out, like the Israel "paratrooper" (a nominal honour to encourage reservist units) and Soviet "Guards" units, but chroniclers and external readers should be wary!

(excellent post on this subject: http://defencewithac.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/the-devils-advocate-special-forces.html)

Singapore's armoured vehicles, part 1: Some things change

This is the first of a two-parter on the development of Singapore's armoured fighting vehicles. I've often been quizzed on the state of development of our armour, and this post is also to serve as a summary of personal observations on the trends of local AFV development. This first bit will cover the changes over the years, with the second looking at some constants - for better or for worse!

I won't attempt to make a forecast (those often go wrong!), but will make an attempt at illuminating the Singaporean army's current thinking about AFVs and how it relates to global trends and technological development.

First and foremost, there's been a focus away from AFVs providing their own swimming capability. Nearly all AFVs operated by the SAF were able to float across rivers and streams, given preparation. However, if you visit an Armour unit today you will find less emphasis on getting across streams on one's own steam and instead more emphasis on working with the Engineers and covering them while they conduct bridging works. Tactical experimentation seems to have come firmly on throwing a bridge across that can serve as a proper logistics link, rather than taking time and effort to ready vehicles for fording.

Effort has been made towards urban survivability. Terrex is one vehicle that seems intended for fighting in towns and other built-up areas. The remote weapons station looks to be able to elevate to high angles to engage targets at all levels, and the counter-sniper sound system may be put to good use (although as any movie-maker will tell you, acoustics in a city is terribly wonky). "Armour doesn't fight urban", was once the refrain. This has changed, and it's perhaps handy that the barrier between green and black beret is blurring. May well spark a rethink of the whole organization.

The answer to the question: "How will we see out of the tank?" has also changed. The vast majority of Singaporean armour still operates under "Vietnam war rules", with vehicle commanders and infantry poking out of hatches to provide vision. In the closed terrain where the SAF trains (and presumably will operate), this makes a modicum of sense. However, time has marched on, with CITV (commander's independent thermal viewer) sights and other innovations such has external-mounted cameras going some way to enable vision under armour. For example, many Western MBTs like the Abrams and Challenger with independent commanders' sights allow the tank commander to search for targets, with the gunner controlling the turret. If the commander wants to direct fire, he can hit a button to orient the turret to the commander's field of view. This has found its way into the SAF vocabulary under the term "hunter-killer": the commander hunts, then the gunner kills. Frankly, this is a long overdue development, and this blog wholeheartedly welcomes it, despite my personal understanding of how dicey it is moving  AFVs about even with many pairs of eyes sticking out.

The utility of cameras to watch one's sectors is still limited - a single camera watching an arc doesn't do a good job portraying depth of field, for one, and may require some sort of binocular package. This is ultimately an engineering question, however, and solutions will likely emerge as more and more nations work with hatches closed. Keeping heads in the vehicle will do more than ensure safety - having half the section hanging out the back of APCs does tend to restrict the field of fire of the main turret armament. While they make up for it somewhat by shooting their own guns out the back, constraining the turret to only firing forward is a bit of a waste.

Our SHORAD vehicles have also had a new lease of life - from RBS 70s mounted on the rather geriatric wheeled V-200, we've gone to Iglas mounted on tracked M113s. With a simple air-search radar, I might add. Air defence is sadly not my strong point, so I hope very much that the V-200 is gone. Since the practice seems to be the Army passing its surplus to requirements AFVs to the Air Force, a Bionix-mounted system might be next. (It's a shame that the RSAF's field defence squadrons no longer have light armour - but it seems the V-200s were much unloved, for some reason.)

Another quieter development is proofing against mines and the increasingly catch-all term IED. One lesser-known issue with mines is that even if armour protection isn't breached the shockwave can be transmitted via AFV seats and surfaces to send the occupants banging about. Certain AFVs that the SAF has have not swopped in their normal, more comfortable seats for harnesses suspended from vehicle roofs, which are intended to be immune from this effect. One hopes that other steps have been taken as well.

The SAF is having another go at battlefield networking in the combat arms. The earlier versions of the Battlefield Management System (BMS) fielded with the Armour formation were, to not put too fine a point on it, were pretty disappointing. Another try is being had with the Infantry formation. The "Advanced Combat Man System" (ACMS) is one such attempt, but the Terrex AFVs come with onboard computing and supposedly have a version of the BMS. Time will tell if the technology is mature.

We don't have any more tank riders, for sure!

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Iron man

Two weeks ago your author noticed a news item on the cyberpioneer webpage, the newsletter of the Army - link here.

It all seems quite a rosy idea, with infantry soldiers being equipped with a cooling unit, power generating system and fuel cells.

However this perhaps seems like a situation where soldiers are carrying too much. To your author, the situation where one adds encumbrance to the soldier to overcome heat is an odd one. By restricting airflow more, even more heat buildup in the field may happen. It may well break down, too. Ultimately, Singapore's Soldier Performance Centre has to trial the unit and do some serious experimenting as to whether the benefits are worth it. Technology may not be the way forward here, unfortunately. Your author is not an expert but a stride-power system, say, may not generate all that much power for the weight it adds.

The most critical elements for infantry survival are of course personal items like boots, water and food. After that, it may be worth remembering that the most critical tool for him to do his job has perhaps been ammunition. That has figured heavily in US and British experience from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This might bear reminding in the light of the ever-increasing load on Singaporean infantry, especially with the plate carriers, which may not be the most appropriate garb in jungle conditions.

Lethal chess pieces

From http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/russias-buildup-on-the-ukraine-border/996/

If I can trust RUSI and the Post on this graphic, there are two things to note:

1) Ukraine's remarkable achievement of turning its entire armed forces around to face east rather than west. Ukraine's army has always oriented west (to face NATO?) - armour and motorized infantry just east of the Polish border, with the Ukranian rocket artillery brigade behind them. This has since changed, and I wonder if a lot of Ukrainian troops are sleeping rough or if they are on proper basing grounds.

2) Russia's military reserve plan seems once again to be working as intended. In order to achieve maximum economy of force, operations in a given area/military district will be reinforced by whatever reinforcements can be spared from others. Their troops have been training accordingly, with each military district supposed to hold some in reserve for such an eventuality. The detachment of troops from the Central military district to the Western certainly shows that their system works.

This is a truly depressing chess game to watch, unfortunately.

The demise of linear frontlines

Very often in military planning there is a temptation to draw straight lines and sectors for one's own forces, denoting clear boundaries. Company A advances along this block, B the one adjacent, C the one further down, and so on. It gives the very Napoleonic image of troops drawn up shoulder to shoulder.

Equally often this image is false; there are simply often not enough bodies on the ground at any given time to wholly secure an imagined "frontline". For nations with shrinking armies - such as Singapore, where the phenomena of a smaller combat-fit force is a reality - this is even more so.

As has been made clear in the much-vaunted "3G Army" campaign, the Singaporean army has sought technology-based solutions to overcome this lack of bodies. On the frontline, there is the "SAF in a backpack" integration of artillery and airforce strike assets with the frontline soldier, gadgets such as improved nightvision and unmanned ground sensors to replace pickets. Unmanned supply vehicles and engineer assets are also perhaps still in the offing, if this (admittedly old) video is any guide. These technologies understandably take a long time to mature.



This blog however submits that planning and a shift in mindsets are equally valid. In an era where there will never be enough troops on the ground, the idea that there is a fixed frontline, composed of units standing shoulder to shoulder, should be abandoned.

Instead of a contiguous front, a model of clusters of men continuously on the move may be more useful. The fighting companies, followed by their associated artillery, air defence and logistical teams. (Defense and Freedom does a better job of elucidating such concepts than I.)

This will require some readjustments. The front is a leaky one, and there is a necessity for all-round defence rather than just frontal ones. Lip service is always paid to such an endeavour but it genuinely has to be emphasized that the army is a group of clusters on the move, not a sanitising front and safe zone behind.

The preparedness and equipment of "rear-area" units such as artillery, air defence, headquarters and logistics ones may have to be examined as well. If enemy light armour breaks through the thin frontage of say an infantry battalion, will the battalion combat service support troops have sufficient training and weapons to see the threat off? Your author is reminded of an anecdote he heard from a Finnish conscript, where an "OPFOR" (opposition forces) SISU personnel carrier somehow snuck through the lines of a unit's rifle companies and wrought havoc on the unprepared headquarters company, before it was mercifully driven off by some lucky simulated rocket shots! Do Singaporean combat units have a brace of MATADOR rockets in the back of the headquarters trucks?

Perhaps (for tactical planning purposes) it may be a good reminder as a matter of staff practice to represent one's units as ovals on the map, not as a continous frontline.

Such changes in practice may matter even more than technology, and its benefits will be apparent even sooner.

Japan lifts self-imposed ban on arms sales

It might have been an April Fool, but Japan has lifted its self-imposed ban on arms exports, which has existed in legal form since the '60s. Exceptions have been made in the past for technology transfer, but the Cabinet's approval of this new legislation removes the 1967 blanket ban.

Japan's new Type 10 MBT - built to be lightweight

OH-1 "Ninja" reconnaissance helicopter - the eyes of Japan's attack helicopter fleet, meant to tank-hunt in its mountainous terrain

This is potentially unpopular with the Japanese populace and is already stirring ire with the region, but a myriad of positive effects spring to mind.

The most obvious one is profits if Japanese defence firms can sell their arms abroad. A rosy picture could potentially be drawn; The Type 96 APC (also known as the Maneuver Combat Vehicle) may prove popular with nations interested in building up a fast wheeled armoured vehicle fleet. The "Hand Arrow" man-portable SAM could compete against the Igla and the Stinger. We may even see the US-2 maritime patrol aircraft, one of the few military flying boats, exported. This may be soon - India has previously shown interest in them.

Type 96 APC

Type-91 "Hand Arrow" MANPAD

US-2 flying boat

More urbanely, ammunition and other military kit such as webbing could be sold abroad, netting a steady flow of income. Surplus to requirements kit such as older tanks could be sold as well.

However, Japanese firms will need to manage their lack of experience, adapting items made for JSDF requirements for overseas users, and other factors; this is ultimately a very commercial issue. Then again, the Japanese name for quality may well rub off. The nation may do well to learn from others such as Brazil's Embraer.

It may be worth establishing a bureau under the Ministry of Defence or Trade to aid firms in this; but these rapidly get into bed with firms if not properly policed.

Secondly, it is arguable whether military sales increase influence, but they certainly can turn out to be another tool for the Japanese foreign service.

Most interestingly, this opening up of the industry will allow firms and the nation to more readily fund new projects. The controversial Mitsubishi F-2 fighter program, aimed at producing an improved and affordable F-16 type fighter, ended up being an expensive but disappointing aircraft. (Sadly, a quarter of the fleet was lost in the 2011 tsunami). Similarly, an attempt to export the Type 10 MBT's remarkable engine to Turkey foundered on the now repealed laws. It has been argued that the cost borne by the Japanese taxpayer would fall if firms were able to develop products jointly with overseas partners and sell beyond the JSDF.

Quietly, Japan has been pursuing a next-generation stealth fighter, the AD-X "Shinshin" (心神), which may have been a gambit to pressure the US to export the F-22 to the JASDF. Its immense potential cost - much of the Japanese defence budget for very few airframes - would seem to rule out its adoption by the Japanese military, and reduce it to no more than a pawn the stealth sales wars. However, if Japanese stealth and fighter technology can be sold abroad as a successor (or less likely, as a competitor) to the F-35 fighter, it may be worth watching this plane.

ATD-X, possibly a mockup

Perhaps we may know it as the F-3 someday.

For but not with nuclear weapons

"For but not with" is a general term used in military procurement, used to describe military equipment fitted for but not with certain parts or weapons - a tank may have the capability to bolt on more armour in wartime, or a ship may be bought initially without a missile launcher to save costs.

A quick internet search suggests quite a few countries with the potential to build and deploy nuclear weapons - Brazil, Spain, Italy.

Closer to home in Asia, there are Japan, South Korea, and Australia. It could be that some nations literally have the nuclear weapon's core and pit and separate rooms, held in readiness, or have a few-year timeline to acquire the necessary raw material such as plutonium and advanced circuits to control the bomb's detonation.

Near Singapore, Australia is a prime candidate - its uranium reserves are well-known, and groups such as ANSTO demonstrate Australian expertise in nuclear science. The RAAF could potentially have delivered it as well; its F-111 fleet could have carried gravity bombs, or a more technically complex weapon may have been mated with the Israeli "Popeye" cruise missile, which was acquired in the late 1990s. Today, the RAAF's F-18s could carry gravity bombs or AGM-158 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. Admittedly, this fascinates your author because one does not often think of Australia as a potential regional hegemon.

Australian F-111 with Popeye missile

Why hide a certain capability? There are multiple considerations - at the expense of deterrence and building confidence in one's own military, a secret capability provides a big stick to be used in actual conflict.

Additionally, there perhaps may be no geopolitical need to build or announce a capability. Japan and South Korea would not profit from ratcheting up tensions by building their own nuclear weapons, covered as they are by American security guarantees, and the same goes for NATO nations (see note below). This can be compared with the case of Pakistan, who sought a nuclear capability in response to India, and China, whose arsenal is largely road-mobile short-range missiles that can hit targets in Asia but not Europe or the continental United States.

More urbanely, it may simply not be popular to announce a nuclear program. In general, the global anti-nuclear taboo remains strong. In Australia's context, strong antinuclear sentiment among its population suggests that even if a covert nuclear weapons capability did exist, making it public would win the military and the incumbent government no support.

Vague leaks alluding to it may be sufficient to deter - there are a staggering number of things attributed to the CIA and the United States' military. Israel certainly profits from muttering about its "Samson Option".

It ultimately depends on the national priorities of the nation in question, and is really a question for individual decision-makers. Perhaps Singaporeans can sleep soundly knowing that most potential nuclear powers in the region are responsible states, with the potential capability to deter any moves by the openly nuclear powers in Asia.

Note: Interestingly, under NATO nuclear sharing agreements, some NATO members host American nuclear weapons on their own soil. These can be used by the host nation in times of conflict. The weapons are nominally guarded by US troops and the US insists it has final control over their use, sidestepping the proliferation question. Obviating the need for others to acquire their own capability is a sensible move by a superpower.

The first 5 minutes - trigger fingers in the transition to war

Photo from Army News

During peacetime, militaries often wisely counsel reticence in opening fire, for safety and discipline reasons. The safety reason is self-evident. A sense of discipline in fire would also be useful for rules of engagement and ammunition conservation purposes.

To overcome this, troopers are often conditioned to take positions and fire their small arms only in response to certain stimuli - certain shouted orders from their junior commanders, man-size targets popping up on a range, and of course the sight and sound of their comrades firing.

However, in the opening skirmishes of a conflict, some may find themselves reticent in doing so if they get involved in an infantry fight. The remnants of carefulness in peacetime training may die hard, preventing an immediate response. There may also be a base reluctance to fire at what may be an unseen or obscured enemy, especially if the circumstances of the battle and location of friendly troops are unknown.

This in itself is not news, as it is generally acknowledged that armies undergo a process of macabre "blooding" in times of conflict, where they adapt to the new reality. Moreover, the S. L. A. Marshall assertion that 75% of American troops in the Second World War never fired their personal weapons with intent to kill at the enemy is a particularly often cited piece of trivia.

This may not be a particularly important matter to dwell on - even in the most desperate infantry fight there are more factors to survival than one's willingness to get into a fighting position and shoot at silhouettes.

Ultimately, this is as much a psychological question as it is a military one, and one that militaries have adjusted and trained for. One can only hope that soldiers survive this simple reluctance in trying circumstances.